In this paper a new formal model of argument accrual is proposed as an adaptation of the ASPIC + framework for structured argumentation. The new model aims to overcome several weaknesses of existing proposals. It is shown to have desirable formal properties that are in line with standard work on formal argumentation, and to be applicable to a range of situations in legal reasoning.
INTRODUCTION
One recurring theme in the computational study of argumentation is that of accrual of arguments, or how several arguments for the same conclusion should be combined. This issue has been especially (although not exclusively) been studied in the context of AI & Law. The main issue is whether accrual should be modelled at the knowledge representation level, by combining dierent reasons for the same conclusion in antecedents of rules (in [15] called the KR approach), or whether it should be modelled at the logical level as a logical operation on arguments (in [15] called the inference approach). The present paper is about the inference approach to accrual. To my knowledge, Verheij was the rst who pursued this approach in his dissertation [19] . In [15] Prakken proposed three principles that any model of argument accrual should satisfy and then proposed an inference-based model that satised these three principles in terms of a combination of Dung's theory of abstract of argumentation frameworks [6] with Pollock's theory of defeasible reasons [14] . The model was implemented by Wietske Visser 1 .
1 Available at http://www.wietskevisser.nl/research/epr/.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for prot or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specic permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. ICAIL '19, June 17-21, 2019 Among the subsequent work is Gordon's recent proposal in [8, 10] in terms of a new version of the Carneades system. So why write yet another paper on argument accrual? There are several reasons for doing so. First, Prakken's [15] model of accrual, although satisfying the three principles of accrual, has several drawbacks. A computational drawback (which it shares with any KR approach) is that every subset of a set of accruing arguments has to be considered, which leads to an exponential increase in the set of arguments that needs to be considered. Another problem of the model is that it requires the labelling of conclusions of arguments with the premises from which they are derived, which is inelegant and arguably unnatural for knowledge engineers. Third, Prakken's model had a specic problem with (non-)accrual of arguments with strict top rules (discussed but not optimally solved in [15] ). Finally, the formal background of Prakken's 2005 approach was only semiformally sketched, while a full formalisation is desirable for various reasons. These problems are avoided in Gordon's recent proposal. However, there are also reasons to improve on his approach, above all that there are counterexamples to Gordon's claim that his operator on statement labellings is monotonic. This in turn makes that his set of skeptical conclusions cannot be uniquely characterised and that his various semantics do not stand in the same relation as in the standard theory of abstract argumentation frameworks.
Accordingly, the aim of the present paper is to present an inferencebased model of argument accrual in the context of the ASPIC + framework that improves on the proposal of [15] by adapting ideas of [8, 10] , but in a way that avoids the technical problems with Gordon's proposal. Then the relevance of the new model for AI & Law will be demonstrated with several applications to legal reasoning. This paper is organised as follows. First in Section 2 the theory of abstract argumentation frameworks and the ASPIC + framework will be introduced. Then in Section 3 the previous approaches of [15] and [8, 10] will be critically examined, after which the new formal model will be presented in Section 4 and formally investigated in Section 5. Then the model will be applied to legal examples in Section 6, after which conclusions will be drawn in Section 7.
FORMAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section I summarise the formal frameworks used below.
Semantics of abstract argumentation frameworks
An abstract argumentation framework (AF ) is a pair hA, Di, where A is a set of arguments and D ✓ A ⇥ A is a relation of defeat. The theory of AFs [6] identies sets of arguments (called extensions) which are internally coherent and defend themselves against defeaters. An argument A 2 A is defended by a set by S ✓ A if for all a given AF , E ✓ A is admissible if E is conict-free and defends all its members; E is a complete extension if E is admissible and A 2 E i A is defended by E; E is a preferred extension if E is a ✓-maximal admissible set; E is a stable extension if E is admissible and attacks all arguments outside it; and E ✓ A is the grounded extension if E is the least xpoint of operator F , where F (S) returns all arguments defended by S. It holds that any preferred, stable or grounded extension is a complete extension. Finally, for T 2 {complete, preferred, grounded, stable}, X is sceptically or credulously justied under the T semantics if X belongs to all, respectively at least one, T extension. An alternative way to characterise the various semantics is with labellings. Denition 2.1. A labelling of a set A of an argument an abstract argumentation framework (A, D) is any pair of non-overlapping subsets (In,Out) of A. A labelling of A is a d-labelling of (A, D) i it satises the following constraints:
(1) an argument is in i all arguments defeating it are out. (2) an argument is out i it is defeated by an argument that is in.
Then stable semantics d-labels all arguments, while grounded semantics minimises and preferred semantics maximises the set of arguments that are d-labelled in and complete semantics allows any d-labelling. It has been shown that the T -extensions according to the extension-based denitions coincide with the in sets of the corresponding T -d-labellings [4] .
Structured argumentation frameworks in ASPIC +
The ASPIC + framework concretises abstract argumentation frameworks by dening the notions of argument and defeat. In its usual formulation it directly generates abstract argumentation frameworks, after which the theory of such frameworks can be used to evaluate the arguments. However, for present purposes it is convenient to work with a formulation in terms of recursive labellings, inspired by similar constructs in [14] . This formulation was in [16] shown to be equivalent to the usual formulation of ASPIC + . Using the recursive-labelling form will allow to adapt ideas from [8, 10] . ASPIC + denes abstract argumentation systems as structures consisting of a logical language L with negation and two sets R s and R d of strict and defeasible inference rules dened over L. In the present paper the specication of L will be left implicit in the examples. Arguments are constructed from a knowledge base (a subset of L) by chaining inferences over L into acyclic graphs (which are trees if no premise is used more than once). Formally (see for detailed illustrations of the denitions the previous publications on ASPIC + , such as [11] [12] [13] ):
• L is a logical language consisting of propositional or ground predicate-logic literals
inference rules of the form {φ 1 , . . . , φ n } ! φ and {φ 1 , . . . , φ n } ) φ respectively (where φ i , φ are meta-variables ranging over w in L), such that R s \ R d = ;. φ 1 , . . . , φ n are called the antecedents and φ the consequent of the rule. 2 Informally, n(r ) is a well-formed formula (w) in L which says that the defeasible rule r 2 R is applicable, so that an argument claiming ¬n(r ) attacks an inference step in the argument using r . We write ψ = −φ just in case ψ = ¬φ or φ = ¬ψ . Also, for any rule r the antecedents and consequent are denoted, respectively, with ant(r ) and cons(r ). 
S such that ψ = −φ, and indirectly consistent i Cl Rs (S) is directly consistent.
In this paper K corresponds to the 'necessary premises' in other ASPIC + publications, which are intuitively certain and therefore not attackable and, moreover, jointly indirectly consistent. We will represent what intuitively are uncertain premises φ as defeasible rules ) φ. This allows us to ignore undermining attack, i.e., attacks on premises, for simplicity. Generalisation of the new approach to the full case with undermining attack is entirely straightforward.
An argument is now formally dened as follows.
Denition 2.5. [Arguments]
A argument A on the basis of a knowledge base K over an argumentation system AS is a structure obtainable by applying one or more of the following steps nitely many times:
( 
with the other notions dened as in (2) . Argument A is strict if DefRules(A) = ; and defeasible otherwise.
Each of the functions Func in this denition is also dened on sets of arguments S = {A 1 , . . . , A n } as follows:
Note that the ) symbol is overloaded to denote an argument while it also denotes defeasible inference rules.
Arguments can be attacked in two ways: on a defeasibly derived conclusion (rebutting attack) and on a defeasible inference step (undercutting attack). While up to now the denitions were the same as in standard ASPIC + , a dierence is that in the recursivelabelling version of ASPIC + arguments can only be attacked on their nal conclusion or inference, while the recursion will take care of attack on a subargument. This change also induces some changes in other denitions of standard ASPIC + . In the following denitions several notions are preceded by a p (for 'Pollock') to distinguish them from the original notions of ASPIC + in e.g. [13] .
• A p-undercuts argument B i Conc(A) = −n(r ) and B has a defeasible top rule r .
• A p-rebuts argument B i Conc(A) = −Conc(B) and B has a defeasible top rule.
The notion of p-defeat can then be dened as follows. First, p-undercutting attacks succeed as p-defeats independently of preferences over arguments, since they express exceptions to defeasible inference rules. Next, p-rebutting attacks succeed only if the attacked argument is not stronger than the attacking argument (as usual, A ≺ B is dened as A � B and B � A while A ⇡ B is dened as A � B and B � A).
Argumentation systems plus knowledge bases form argumentation theories, which induce p-structured argumentation frameworks.
Denition 2.8. A p-structured argumentation framework (pSAF)
dened by an argumentation theory AT = (AS, KB) is a triple hA, C p , � i where A is the set of all arguments constructed from KB in AS, � is an ordering on A, and (X, Y ) 2 C p i X p-attacks Y .
Abstract argumentation frameworks are then generated from pSAFs as follows:
Argument evaluation is then recursively dened as follows: In this section I critically examine the previous inference-based accounts of accrual in [15] and [8, 10] . I rst recall the three principles of accrual proposed in [15] .
(1) An accrual is sometimes weaker than its accruing elements, due to the possibility that accruing reasons are not independent. For example, if multiple witnesses who all say the same are from a group of people who are more likely to conrm each other's statements when these statements are false than when they are true, then the accrual of the witness testimony arguments will be weaker than the individual accruing arguments [14] .
(2) An accrual makes its elements inapplicable. This is for the same reason: if John and Mary both testify that the same statement is true but the accrual is weaker than their individual testimonies, then no inferences should be drawn from their individual testimonies.
(3) Flawed arguments should not accrue. If an argument is based on grounds that are refuted, it should not enter into the accrual. For example, if John can be shown to make his testimony while hallucinating, his testimony should not enter the accrual with Mary's testimony but should be fully ignored.
Prakken (2005)
The account of [15] can be directly applied within ASPIC + . The main idea is threefold. First, every conclusion drawn by applying a defeasible rule is labelled with the set of conclusions of all arguments to which the rule was applied. Second, a defeasible accrual inference rule is added to R d , of the following form (in fact, the rule is a scheme for any natural number i such that 1  i  n):
Finally, the following undercutter scheme is formulated for any
This undercutter says that when a set of reasons accrues, no proper subset accrues.
This proposal satises the three principles of accrual. First, argument orderings are possible according to which an argument applying the Accrual rule to a set S is weaker than an argument applying the Accrual rule to a set S 0 ⇢ S. Second, any argument defeating a subargument of an argument that has the Accrual rule as its top rule also defeats the latter argument. And third, the accrual undercutter makes sure that lesser accruals do not apply if a larger accrual applies. See for more details [15] .
On the other hand, this approach has some problems. First, labelling conclusions with sets of premises seems unnatural. More importantly, for any set S of reasons for the same conclusion φ, the number of arguments is in the worst case exponential to the cardinality of S, since applications of the accrual undercutter can be defeated either directly or on a proper subargument. Finally, on this account arguments with strict top rules cannot enter an accrual, which seems wrong if the argument is defeasible because of defeasible rules applied by subarguments (see [15] for an example). In Section 6 below I will argue that the analysis in [15] is awed and that the present proposal improves on it.
Gordon (2018)
In [8, 10] Gordon avoids the rst and second weakness of [15] in a new version of the Carneades system [9] . In Carneades an argument has a set of premises, a set of exceptions (in [8, 10] called undercutters) and a conclusion, which is either pro or con a statement. Unlike in ASPIC + , all arguments are elementary, that is, they contain a single inference step; they are combined in a recursive denition of and argument graph. In the new version all statements in an argument graph are labelled as in, out or undecided. This is achieved by rather involved recursive dependencies between various denitions of concepts like issues, argument weight, proof standards, and supported and applicable arguments.
The essence of Gordon's new approach to accrual is that an argument can be applicable even if not all its premises are In, as long as no premise is undecided. Thus a single argument can be constructed such that it contains all potential reasons for its conclusion, where in general only some of these reasons have to apply for an argument to be In. This is how [8] avoids an exponential blow up in the number of arguments to be constructed.
To deal with cycles, Gordon denes in [10] an operator on statement labellings, which in [8] he claims to be monotonic. If this is true, then it has a least xed point. Accordingly, Gordon denes the set of sceptically acceptable conclusions as the statements that are labelled In in the least xed point of the operator (which he calls the grounded labelling). Moreover, he denes notions of stable and preferred labellings analogously to [6] 's semantics and the p-labellings of ASPIC + dened in the previous section. Being able to do so is valuable, since it uniquely characterises the set of sceptically acceptable conclusions (which agrees with the idea of skeptical acceptance) and it preserves similar relations between the various semantics as in [6] , which is desirable for technical reasons that cannot be explained here for reasons of space.
However, there is a problem, since there are counterexamples to the claim in [8] that the operator on statement labellings is monotonic, due to the fat that any proof standard is possible in general. Since listing the denitions of [8] would require several pages, I just list the counterexample here and leave it to the reader to verify it. Consider two arguments a 1 for p and a 2 for ¬p, both with no premises or undercutters and with weight > 0.0 where a 1 has higher weight than a 2 , and {p, ¬p} is an issue and the proof standard for the issue says that a position s satises its proof standard i (1) it has an applicable argument in the current labelling and (2) no other position from the same issue is In in the current labelling and (3) some argument for s has higher weight than all arguments for the other positions in the issue that satisfy the previous conditions. Then F (;, ;) = ({p}, {¬p}) while F ({¬p}, ;) = ({¬p}, {p}).
In the next section I will try to retain as much as possible of Gordon's new approach in the context of recursive ASPIC + , while avoiding its technical problems.
THE NEW PROPOSAL
In this section I modify the recursive version of ASPIC + in order to capture accrual of arguments as a logical operation that overcomes the weaknesses of [15] and [8, 10] . Henceforth I write 'p-defeat' as 'defeat' for simplicity.
The new model of accrual is based on several key ideas. First, arguments for the same conclusion are collected in a so-called accrual set. A key idea here is that accrual sets are dened relative to a labelling of the set A of arguments, to be able to express that only arguments of which no immediate subargument is Out and no undercutter is In enter the accrual set. This will help satisfying the third principle of accrual. Note that the labelling referred to in the next denition does not have to be a d-labelling but any any partition of the set of arguments into subsets of arguments labelled In, or Out, or not labelled. 
q; q ) r 4 ¬p; f 4 ) r 5 ¬r 3 ; f 5 ) r 6 r 3 } (with the rule names according to n attached to the arrows). The following arguments can be constructed (the premise arguments will below be left implicit).
C 2 : f 5 ) r 3 These arguments are displayed in Figure 1 , together with their attack relations: C 1 undercuts B 1 , while all symmetric defeat relations are rebuttals. Let l 1 be the empty labelling. Then p has three accrual sets, namely, {A 1 }, {A 2 } and {A 1 , A 2 }, while all other conclusions have singleton sets as accrual sets. Next let l 2 be such that C 1 is In while C 2 , B 1 and B 2 are Out and f 1 and f 2 are undecided. Then {A 1 , A 2 } is the only accrual set for p while ¬p does not have an accrual set.
A second key idea is that the argument preference relation � is now redened as a relation on the powerset of A. It is assumed to satisfy some properties in order to handle cases with strict-and-rm arguments in an intuitive way. This induces the notion of an accrual argumentation framework as follows. A third key idea of the new approach is to make the notion of defeat relative to a labelling, so that in case of rebutting arguments only those arguments are compared that have no undercutters that are In and immediate subarguments that are Out. This will also help satisfying the third principle of accrual. and some s l (Conc(B)) it holds that s l (Conc(A)) ⌃ s l (Conc(B)).
Note that if there is nonempty accrual set for a conclusion of a rebutted argument, then the argument will be Out anyway, so its defeat relations are irrelevant. Finally, inspired by [8] , I dene a function on labellings and dene the new semantics in terms of the xpoints of this function. An l-labelling of an aSAF is any xpoint of F . It is easy to see that the F operator always returns a d-labelling in the sense of Denition 2.1. We would now like to dene the notions of complete, stable, preferred and grounded l-labellings as the corresponding p-labellings were dened in Section 2.1. However, before this can be done in a way that preserves the relations between these semantics as in Section 2.1, some technical work has to be done, which will be the topic of the next subsection.
Example 4.7. [running
example ct'd] Consider rst the initial argument ordering of Example 4.7 plus {C 1 } ⇡ {C 2 } and consider the empty labelling l. Then F (l) = l 0 makes all premise arguments In and leaves the other arguments undecided. Then l 00 = F (l 0 ) also makes A 1 and A 2 in since they have no l 0 defeaters since they both strictly l 0 -defeat B 2 . So B 2 is Out in l 00 while the other arguments that were undecided in l 0 are still undecided in l 0 . Then F (l 00 ) = l 00 so l 00 is the grounded labelling. There are two preferred labellings: the one extends l 00 by making C 2 and B 1 In and C 1 Out while the other extends l 00 by making C 1 In and C
Example 4.8. Consider:
A: ) p B : ) ¬p C: ) r D : C ) ¬p E: ) ¬r Suppose {A} ≺ {B} while {B, D} ≺ {A} and {C} ⇡ {E} (this is an example of an accrual that is weaker than some of its elements).
I rst show why why weakly applicable arguments should be allowed to enter accrual sets. Suppose otherwise; then the only accrual set for ¬p is {B} and since {A} ≺ {B}, we have that F (;, ;) = ({B}, {A}) and F ({B}, {A}) = ({B}, {A}). But we also have that
I next explain why weakly applicable arguments do not have to be in an accrual set and why there can be multiple accrual sets. In other words, in dening defeat we should, for each of the two conclusions involved in the rebuttal, alternatively consider all possible extensions of the set of strongly applicable arguments with weakly applicable arguments. The reason is that if we only compare the two sets with all such arguments, then in the current example, if we start with the empty labelling to obtain the grounded extension, we have to compare {A} with {B, D} only, so the outcome is that A is in the grounded l-labelling while B and D are not. This is undesirable since the fact that C is only weakly applicable indicates that a reasonable evaluator could decide to adopt E and thereby reject D, in which case the comparison would only be between A and B. With the current denitions the outcome is that the grounded l-labelling is empty. Note also that otherwise (if the only accrual set for B is s l (B) = {B, D}) the characteristic function F is again not monotonic, since then F (;, ;) = ({A}, {B, D}) while F ({E}, {C}) = ({B, E}, {A, C, D}).
I nally show how the new proposal deals with strict arguments, i.e., arguments that cannot be attacked. First, since K is assumed to be indirectly consistent, it cannot be that two accrual sets for arguments with jointly contradictory conclusions both contain a strict argument, since otherwise the empty set is indirectly inconsistent, so K is indirectly inconsistent. Next, if s l (A) contains a strict argument A 0 and B's conclusion contradicts A's conclusion, then s l (B) ≺ s l (A) by condition (3) of Denition 4.1. So all arguments in s l (B), which are all defeasible by assumption that K is indirectly consistent, are defeated by A 0 and are Out in F (l) since A 0 has no defeaters. Moreover, any defeasible member of s l (A) is In in F (l) unless it has an undercutter that is not Out in F (l). In sum, the new proposal arguably treats strict arguments in an intuitively acceptable way.
FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW PROPOSAL
In this section I investigate the formal properties of the new proposal. First, we would like that the new semantics preserves the Dungean relations between the semantics and, second, we would like that if each statement has at most one argument, then the new denitions reduce to the old ones. I now address both issues in turn.
Verifying the Dungean relations between the semantics
What is to be proven is that the grounded l-labelIing is unique and included in any other l-labelling, that every stable l-labelling is preferred and that every grounded, stable or preferred l-labelling is complete. I rst prove that the characteristic function of an aSAF is monotonic. To this end I rst dene an ordering on pairs of subsets of A. Overloading the symbol ✓ I say that (S 1 , S 2 ) ✓ (T 1 ,T 2 ) i S 1 ✓ T 1 and T 1 ✓ T 2 . I state without proof that this ordering on pairs of sets is a complete partial order, as required for applying xpoint theory to conclude that F is monotonic. Then the following lemma can be proven. (Conc(B) ). We prove that these sets are also accrual sets for A and B given l. For any argument C in any of these two sets:
In' then C < Out and if C 2 Out' then C < In. So if C is strongly applicable in l 0 then C is weakly or strongly applicable in l, and if C is weakly applicable in l 0 then C is also weakly applicable in l. Moreover, since l ✓ l 0 , all arguments for Conc(A), respectively, Conc(B) that are strongly applicable in l are also strongly applicable in l 0 , so they are in s l 0 (Conc(A)), respectively, s l 0 (Conc(B)), so they are in s l (Conc(A)), respectively, s l (Conc(B)). Hence s l 0 (Conc(A)) and s l 0 (Conc(B)) are also accrual sets according to l. And since the preference ordering on 2 A does not depend on labellings, we have that A also l-defeats
B. ⇤
It can now be shown that F is monotonic. P 5.2. For any pair of labellings l 1 and l 2 such that Because of this result the grounded l-labelling can be dened as the smallest l-labelling, a complete l-labelling as any l-labelling, a stable l-labelling as a total l-labelling and a preferred l-labelling as any maximal l-labelling. The original relations between these semantics are then preserved, as well as the guarantee of existence of complete and preferred l-labellings (recall that ✓ on 2 A is a complete partial order).
Reduction to ASPIC + if no proper accruals
The next thing to prove is that if there are no proper accruals, then everything reduces to the original ASPIC + semantics. For reasons of space I have to conne myself to stating the two lemmas on which the proof depends. First I make the obvious assumption that {A} � {B} just in case A � B. This assumption immediately yields the following lemma. Another useful Lemma follows from the proof in [16] of the equivalence of d-labellings and p-labellings for ASPIC + .
L 5.4. For any p-labelling (l-labelling): A 2 Out i some subargument of A is defeated (l-defeated) by an argument that is In.
With these lemmas the proof of the following proposition is straightforward and has a similar structure as the proof of Proposition 5.2. Next, that an accrual makes its elements inapplicable can most clearly be seen if all arguments in the relevant accrual sets are strongly applicable. Then for each of the two conclusions involved in a rebuttal there are unique accrual sets. Thus it is ensured that if a 'larger' accrual set is too weak, then the conclusion cannot be saved by a stronger 'smaller' accrual set. see again Example 4.8 for an illustration. More generally, the second principle is respected by requiring that all strongly applicable arguments for a conclusion are in the accrual set for that conclusion. At rst sight it would seem that the possibility to include weakly applicable arguments in an accrual set violates this principle. However, above we have seen why this is still a good idea. Moreover, in preferred and stable l-labellings the set of undecided arguments is minimal.
Finally, the principle that awed arguments may not accrue is respected by leaving arguments of which an undercutter is In or an immediate subargument is Out outside any accrual set.
APPLICATIONS 6.1 Accrual of strict reasons
First I revisit an example from [15] to illustrate how the present proposal overcomes a weakness of the proposal in [15] .
Example 6.1. Suppose in a criminal case the issue is whether the suspect was in Amsterdam on the morning of October 22nd, 2004 and consider a witness Albert who testies he saw the suspect in the Vondelpark at 9.00am that day and a witness Bill who testies that he saw the suspect at Central Station at 10.30am that day. When combined with some obvious background knowledge, both statements on their own deductively imply that the subject was in Amsterdam that morning. Therefore, the two witness testimonies cannot be combined in an accrual for the latter proposition, since strict inferences do not accrue. Schematically:
A: testies(a, V (s, 9.00)), so presumably V (s, 9.00), so deductively A(s, morning)
B: testies(b, S(s, 10.30)), so presumably S(s, 10.30), so deductively A(s, morning)
In [15] Prakken wrote:
At rst sight, the result that the witness testimonies do not accrue with respect to the proposition morning would seem counterintuitive. Yet the principle that accrual of strict arguments does not make sense is beyond doubt so that the intuition must be at fault.
However, the principle that accrual of strict arguments does not make sense is only beyond doubt for strict-and-rm arguments, so for unattackable arguments. Indeed, on the present account, the two witness testimonies accrue for the conclusion that the suspect was in Amsterdam. Suppose a third witness Cathy says that the suspect was not in Amsterdam that morning:
C: testies(c, ¬A(s, morning), so presumably ¬A(s, morning).
There is one accrual set for A, which is also the unique accrual set for B, namely, {A, B}. Note that both A and B rebut C but not conversely. To see whether these rebutting attacks succeed as defeats, {A, B} has to be compared with {C}.
Arguing about legislative proposals
In [17] a debate about a legislative proposal was modelled in ASPIC + with two schemes of defeasible inference rules (which themselves are also schemes). For good consequences a set of defeasible rules of the following form was assumed for each n ≥ 1:
C n is good Therefore (presumably), action A is good. A similar scheme was assumed for bad consequences. Thus in fact the KR approach to accrual was applied, which as noted above suers from the same exponential blow-up as [15] 's inference approach. I now sketch how the same example can be modelled in the present approach.
The debate is about a proposal of a previous Dutch government to impose mandatory minimum sentences for recidivism in case of serious crimes. Three good consequences were opposed to two bad consequences of the proposed bill. The good consequences were GC1: the bill will reduce crime; GC2: the bill is meeting the call from the public for more severe sentences; GC3: the bill has the symbolic eect of underlining norms. The bad consequences were BC1: the bill will harden the relationship between the judiciary and the legislator; BC2: the bill will force judges to impose severe sentences for not so serious cases. In addition, the argument for GC1 was attacked on its causal premise that the bill will reduce crime and the argument for GC2 was attacked on its evaluative premise that meeting the call from the public for more severe sentences is good. Schematically:
. . ) ¬MeetsCallGood Let us denote the premise subarguments of GC 1 with GC 1a and GC 1b likewise with the other arguments. While in the approach of [17] 6 arguments for BillGood and 3 arguments for ¬BillGood have to be considered, now only 3, respectively 2 arguments have to be considered. In addition, there is now, unlike in [17] , no need for undercutters of lesser accruals. The contents of the accrual sets for BillGood and ¬BillGood depend on how the two premise attacks are resolved. Let us for ease of illustration order the sets of arguments for these conclusions in terms of their number of element.
To construct the grounded labelling, let l be the empty labelling. Then all nonempty subsets of {GC 1 , GC 2 , GC 3 } are an accrual set for BillGood and all nonempty subsets of {BC 1 , BC 2 } are an accrual set for ¬BillGood. So any argument for BillGood l-defeats any argument for ¬BillGood and vice versa. If both C and E are strictly preferred over their target, then C strictly l-defeats GC 1 by p-rebutting its rst subargument, while E strictly l-defeats GC 2 by p-rebutting 3 Out and it leaves {GC 3 , BC 1 , BC 2 } undecided. Then both accrual sets are uniquely determined relative to l: we have s 0 l (BillGood) = {GC 3 } and s 0 l (¬BillGood) = {BC 1 , BC 2 }. So both BC 1 and BC 2 strictly l-defeat GC 3 . So l 00 = F (l 0 ) equals l 0 except that B 1 and B 2 moves from undecided to In and GC 3 moves from undecided to Out. Then F (l 00 ) = l 00 so l 00 is the grounded labelling. So ¬BillGood is justied in grounded semantics.
To illustrate credulous reasoning in grounded semantics, assume now that {C} is still strictly preferred over {GC 1a } but that {E} ⇡ {GC 2b }. Then what changes is that E and GC 2b defeat each other, so l 0 = F (l) now also leaves these two arguments undecided. This induces an additional s 0 l (BillGood) besides {GC 3 }, namely, {GC 2 , GC 3 }. Then both of GC 2 , GC 3 defeat both of BC 1 , BC 2 and vice versa, so F (l 0 ) = l 0 and both BillGood and its negation are defensible in grounded semantics. Moreover, we have that the following two labellings are maximal xpoints of the operator on labellings: the rst one is l extended with GC 2 , GC 3 in In and BC 1 , BC 2 in Out while the second is with GC 2 , GC 3 in Out and BC 1 , BC 2 in In. The same grounded and preferred labellings are obtained if GC 2a strictly l-and F (l)-defeats E, although then there is a unique accrual set for BillGood, namely, {GC 2 , GC 3 }.
Factor-based reasoning
Factor-based reasoning as modelled in, for instance, CATO [2] , is a natural application domain for models of accrual. In factorbased domains there are no clear rules but only factors pro and con a conclusion, which can in dierent cases occur in dierent constellations. Then sets of factors pro and con must be weighed, which can be seen as argument accrual. Below I sketch how the present approach can be used to model this weighing process.
In [1] Al-Abdulkarim et al. model (among other things) reasoning with CATO-style factor hierarchies in abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs, see [5] ). Briey, ADFs are directed graphs where the nodes represent statements and the links between nodes can be typed. Al-Abdulkarim et al. consider the case where links either support or attack a statement. Each statement in an ADF has an acceptance condition dened in terms of its parents. In general, ADFs allows cycles, which requires xpoint semantics to deal with them. For example, if there can be con links from n to n 0 and vice versa while the acceptance condition of n is that n 0 is rejected while the acceptance condition of n 0 is that n is accepted. For example, consider a snapshot of a factor hierarchy displayed in Figure 2 . On the basis of their opinion on the relative priority between factor sets [1] propose the following acceptance conditions:
The last clause is the default value of F102 if no other rule applies. The rules are prioritised by the order in which they are listed, with the rule with the highest priority listed rst.
Let us now see how this can be represented in the current version of ASPIC + . First, each pro, respectively, con link in a factor hierarchy between factors f and f 0 is represented as a defeasible rule f ) f 0 , respectively, f ) ¬f 0 . If desired, then a positive or negative default value for a factor f can be specied by including a rule ) f or ) ¬f . Next, the acceptance conditions translate to preferences between accrual sets of arguments with particular top rules. Let us in our example denote any argument for F 102, respectively, ¬F 102 as A x , respectively, B x , where x is the number of the factor which is the antecedent of the argument's top rule. Let us also for any set S of arguments pro, respectively, con F 102 denote S − as any nonempty subset of S and S + as any superset with arguments for F 102, respectively, ¬F 102 (the latter including the default value for F 102 if specied). Then the above Prolog program corresponds to the following set of preferences:
The default rule ) ¬F 102 can be included in these preferences in such a way that it is relevant only if no other argument for F 102 or ¬F 102 can be constructed and that otherwise its inclusion does not change any of the above preference relations.
Al-Abdulkarim et al. claim that their Prolog program with the acceptance conditions is like a rule base in ASPIC + . However, we now see that it is instead like a specication of a preference relation on sets of arguments.
Embedding Al-Abdulkarim et al.'s method in the above way in the present version of ASPIC + may have a number of benets. For example, the method thus also applies to cases with defeat cycles. Also, the preference relation on A can depend on more than just the arguments' top rules. For instance, in our example preferences may also depend on how strongly a factor pro or con F 102 is derived (this is impossible in ADFs, in which a statement's acceptability status is fully stated in terms of the status its parents). Also, the method overcomes a limitation of Al-Abdulkarim et al.'s method in that since the Prolog program implicitly expresses a preference between its clauses, in many cases only the winning arguments are constructed. By contrast, in ASPIC + the losing arguments are also constructed, which may, for instance, be benecial for purposes of explanation. Finally, by embedding the method in ASPIC + any way of reasoning about determining the base factors in a factor hierarchy can be embedded.
Rules, Principles and Exclusionary Reasons
Not all reasons accrue. Raz [18] distinguished ordinary from exclusionary reasons. While ordinary reasons for or against a conclusion have to be weighed, exclusionary reasons decide the issue on their own and exclude (in ASPIC + terminology undercut) other reasons on the same issue. This distinction is related to Dworkin's [7] distinction between principles and rules. Verheij et al. [20] convincingly argue this this is only a matter of degree. Rules only exclude those reasons that were taken into account when adopting the rule; if new reasons come up, then they must still be weighed together with the reasons provided by the rule.
Let us see whether Verheij et al. 's account can be modelled in the present approach. Assume the issue is whether some legal eect e occurs, that there is one reason p 1 pro e and one reason c 1 con e, and that p 1 is ruled to be an exclusionary reason pro e. This yields the following defeasible rules, the rst two of which express reasons, the third is the rule that expresses that p 1 is an exclusionary reason for e and the fourth and fth are undercutters ensuring that other reasons concerning e besides the rule are not weighed. 4 } for e (since their immediate subarguments are In in l 0 = F (l)) and {A 5 } for ¬e. Then the outcome is decided by the preference relation between these sets. If the original con factor c 1 should also be allowed to enter the new weighing process, then this can be achieved by adding r 6 : c 2 ) ¬r 3 , which undercuts the undercutter r 3 in case c 2 holds.
Clarifying some terminology from argumentation theory
In argumentation theory often a distinction is made between various ways in which multiple 'reasons' can support a conclusion. This is also relevant for legal reasoning; see, for instance, the discussion in Section 3.A.3 of [3] on the various types of support in evidential legal arguments. The terminology varies; here I adopt the terms recently used by [21] . Let us consider the special case of two potential reasons p and q for the same conclusion r . Informally, if both p and q are needed to build a convincing argument for r , then the resulting argument for r is called linked, if each reason on its own suces to build a convincing argument for r , then the argument is called convergent while if each of p and q can on its own be used to build an argument but the argument that uses both is more convincing, the argument is called cumulative. Cumulative arguments are thus a special case of what in the present paper are called accruals; more precisely, they are the special case in which an accrual is always stronger than its elements. These denitions are only a rst attempt and much discussion in the literature is on making them more precise. In [22] formal denitions of these and related concepts are given in the context of ASPIC + . However, accruals are in their classication, following [15] regarded as special kinds of linked arguments, namely, as arguments with a top rule corresponding to [15] 's accrual inference scheme (see Section 3.1 above). Since the present paper has replaced [15] 's approach with a new approach, the question arises how accruals, and cumulative arguments in particular, can be formally characterised given the present approach to argument accrual. First I briey summarise the essence of [22] 's denitions of linked and convergent arguments. An argument for conclusion r is, relative to two propositions p and q, linked if it has a top rule p, q { r and convergent if it either has a top rule p { r or a top rule q { r (the arrow notation { here reects that in all these cases the rule can be either defeasible or strict). On this account, a convergent 'argument' with two reasons p and q is in fact a set of two separate arguments for the same conclusion q. After having given these denitions, [22] continue by combining them with the notion of 'serial' arguments, which are arguments that chain multiple inference steps. However, this complication is for present purposes irrelevant, so I will just focus on the case where there are several potential reasons for the same conclusion, where each of these reasons is either given as a fact or as a conclusion of an argument. How can cumulative arguments then be characterised?
Since the accrual sets of Denition 4.1 contain arguments for the same conclusion, we would at rst sight seem to have lost the ability to distinguish between convergent and accruals/cumulative arguments. However, the key is the argument ordering. In the literature on argumentation theory the problem is often characterised in terms of whether an argument can convince an audience (see e.g. the initial discussions in [21] ). In the present setting, this is the question whether an argument survives the competition with its counterarguments given all relevant attack and defeat relations between arguments. And the defeat relation depends on the argument ordering. We can say that two reasons p and q are linked as regards claim r if both p and q are needed to build an argument for r , so if there is a rule p, q { r but no rules p { r and q { r . By contrast, for both convergent and cumulative reasons there are rules p { r and q { r but no rule p, q { r . Then let A 1 be an argument for r with top rule p { r and A 2 an argument with top rule q { r . We then say that A 1 and A 2 are convergent whenever {A 1 } ⇡ {A 1 , A 2 } and {A 2 } ⇡ {A 1 , A 2 }, they are cumulative accruals (or cumulative for short) whenever {A 1 } ≺ {A 1 , A 2 } and {A 2 } ≺ {A 1 , A 2 }, and they are non-cumulative accruals otherwise. In other words, A 1 and A 2 are convergent i together the arguments are just as 'strong' in the argument ordering as either A 1 or A 2 alone, they are cumulative if together they are stronger than either A 1 or A 2 alone, and they are non-cumulative accruals if together they are stronger or weaker than either A 1 or A 2 alone. This account in terms of relative strength is arguably a more natural way to characterise the dierence between convergent and accrual arguments than an account that reduces accruals to a special kind of linked arguments.
Gordon [8] denes the notions of linked, convergent and cumulative arguments as properties of individual arguments, and he does so in terms of dierent weight functions on arguments. An argument is linked i its conclusion has maximum weight just in case all its premises are in and minimum weight otherwise, it is convergent i its conclusion has maximum weight just in case at least one of its premises is in and minimum weight otherwise, and it is cumulative i its weight increases the more of its premises are In. Thus Gordon denes, just as the present proposal, the dierence between convergent and cumulative arguments in terms of the strength of an argument, although in his case this strength is absolute instead of relative. Unlike in the present proposal, Gordon does not address the accrual of multiple arguments for the same conclusion. An advantage of accruing multiple arguments is that thus arguments based on dierent inference rules can be naturally accrued. For example, we may have two arguments for the same conclusion based on the argument schemes from expert opinion and from statistical generalisation. It is not obvious how such arguments can be naturally combined in a single Carneades-style argument without turning the inference rules into premises.
CONCLUSION
In this paper a new formal model of argument accrual has been proposed as an adaptation of the ASPIC + framework for structured argumentation. The model advances the state-of-the art in that it overcomes several weaknesses of previously proposed models of argument accrual. It was shown to satisfy [15] 's three principles of accrual, to reduce to 'standard' ASPIC + if each statement has at most one argument, and to have desirable formal properties that are in line with standard work on formal argumentation. Its usefulness was illustrated by applications to a range of situations in legal reasoning. Among other things, this has claried the relation with recent work on factor-based legal reasoning using abstract dialectical frameworks. Future work should turn the current semantic specication into computational procedures and should further investigate its applicability to realistic argumentation scenarios in legal and other kinds of reasoning.
